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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
CARLTON CURTIS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 14411 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal case in which the appellant was 
convicted of distributing for value a controlled substance in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)A(a)(ii) (1953). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On July 2, 1975, the defendant-appellant was tried 
to a jury before the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, and found 
guilty of the offense of unlawful distribution of a controlled 
substance for value. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent, the State of Utah, seeks affirmation of 
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the trial court's decision overruling defendant-appellant's 
motion for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The testimony at trial indicates that the following 
events transpired: 
The appellant was tried and found guilty by a jury 
on July 2, 1975, for the offense of unlawful distribution for 
value of the controlled substance, lysergic acid diethylamide 
(LSD) to the State's chief witness, Mary Lee Bosh. 
Mary Bosh testified in substance as follows: she 
was employed by Region Four Narcotic Task Force, and in the 
course of her employment met with police officers at the 
Region Four Task Force office in Provo, Utah, on January 2, 
1975. At this time she was searched, as was her car (Tr. 
10,11). No drugs were found on her person or in her car 
(Tr.18,20). She was then given money by the police officers 
with which to purchase drugs, which purchase she had pre-
viously set up. She left this meeting and met Karen Davis, 
who directed her to the Provo Western Motel, where the 
defendant sold Mary Bosh three squares of "acid" for ten 
dollars. She thereupon left the motel, took Karen Davis 
home and met with police officers, there delivering to 
them the "acid." (Tr. 11-13). 
-2-
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Mary Bosh further testified that she was a confi-
dential informant for Region Four Narcotics Task Force, and 
was paid a commission based on how much money she spent for 
each buy. 
Other witnesses for the State corroborated the 
testimony of Mary Bosh as it related to the times prior to 
entering the motel and after returning to the police (Tr. 
18,20). They also testified that the "acid" was delivered 
by Officer Phil Johnson to Dr. Wesley Parrish for testing 
(Tr.7). Mary Bosh turned the acid over to Officer Johnson 
(Tr.23). Examination and testing of the substance revealed 
that it was lysergic acid diethylamide (Tr.8). 
Karen Davis testified that during the time Mary 
Bosh was in the motel with them no one sold her anything 
(Tr.26) . The defendant denied giving Mary Bosh any "acid" 
(Tr.30), although Karen Davis admitted that drugs changed 
hands in the motel room (Tr.26). 
The defendant subsequently submitted an affidavit 
of bias on the part of a juror. The affidavit alleged 
that a juror was a supervisor where the defendant formerly 
worked, and that the defendant did not recognize this juror 
until a recess in the trial when he (juror) was pointed 
-3-
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out by defendant's mother. The affidavit also states that 
the defendant never informed his attorney of his former 
relationship to the juror until subsequent to the trial. 
Also stated in the affidavit is the allegation that this 
juror at least on one occasion reprimanded the defendant 
while both were working at Spanish Fork Foundry (R.17,18). 
The record does not contain the voir dire 
examination, so it is not within the record as to whether 
the juror was asked of this relationship or not. 
Defendant's motion for a new trial was overruled 
by the trial court. 
Judgment was pronounced in December, 1975 (R.13)* 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED 
SINCE NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION RESULTING IN PREJUDICE TO 
APPELLANT WAS SHOWN. 
The rule in Utah is that the trial court has 
discretion to grant or refuse motions for new trials and 
that appellate courts will not disturb such trial court 
rulings unless an abuse of discretion, resulting in 
prejudice to the defendant, is shown. State v. Weaver, 
_4_ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
78 Utah 555, 6 P.2d 167 (1931); State v. Draper, 83 Utah 
115, 27 P.2d 39 (1933). 
Appellant was convicted by a jury, and the 
trial court refused to disturb this verdict. Arguments for 
a new trial were heard by the trial court, resulting in a 
denial of appellant's motion for a new trial (R.19). It 
is apparent the trial court did not feel that sufficient 
grounds existed for a new trial; thus, no disturbance of 
the jury's verdict. This follows the rule of law in Utah 
set forth in State v. Kelbach, 23 Utah 2d 231, 238, 461 P.2d 
297, 301 (1969): 
"This court may not interfere 
with a jury verdict, unless upon 
review of the entire record, there 
emerges errors of sufficient gravity 
to indicate that defendant's rights 
were prejudiced in some substantial 
manner, i.e., the error must be 
such that it is reasonably probable 
that there would have been a result 
more favorable to the appellant in 
the absence of error." 
Appellant has not shown an abuse of discretion 
by the trial court in denying the motion for a new trial. 
Even if error were shown, it would have to be such " . . . 
that it is reasonably probable that there would have been 
a result more favorable to the appellant in the absence 
of error." State v. Kelbach, supra. 
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The record in this case does not reflect error. 
Appellant alleges in his affidavit that he was employed, 
prior to his trial, at Spanish Fork Foundry. He also 
alleges that one of the jurors was a supervisor at 
Spanish Fork Foundry, and that on one occasion he 
(appellant) was reprimanded by this supervisor (juror) 
(R.17). Appellant alleges in his brief that the juror 
did not make these facts known at voir dire. (There is 
no way of determining this, since the voir dire in this 
case was not made a part of the record.) The affidavit 
does not establish that the juror in question was 
appellant's supervisor, nor does it establish the 
relationship, if there was one, between the appellant 
and the juror in question. Appellantfs affidavit alleges 
a poor work record while he was employed at Spanish Fork 
Foundry, but there is no showing that the juror-supervisor 
knew of appellant's poor work record. 
No bias is shown by the record in this case, 
nor is any probability of bias shown. The trial court 
did not, therefore, abuse its discretion in denying 
appellant's motion. 
-6-
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POINT II 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF MASTER-SERVANT WAS NOT 
ESTABLISHED AS GROUNDS FOR A CHALLENGE FOR IMPLIED BIAS 
PER UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-30-19(2) (1953). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-19(2) (1953), says 
in part: 
"A challenge for implied 
bias may be taken for all or any 
of the following causes, and for 
no other: . . . (2) Standing in 
the relation of . . . master and 
servant. . . . " 
Appellant cites the above section and argues 
that a challenge could have been taken for implied bias 
had the juror's answers to voir dire revealed his 
relationship to the appellant. It is to be noted that 
the record does not reflect whether or not the juror was 
ever questioned on the matter during voir dire, and 
since the record does not disclose this, conjecture 
outside the record must not be a basis for appellant's 
argument. 
Appellant's affidavit discloses only that he 
and the juror in question, Lawrence Knotts, had worked 
at the same time at Spanish Fork Foundry. There is 
no allegation that Knotts was appellant's supervisor. 
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More important, there is no allegation that appellant 
was in Knotts' employ at the time of the trial, nor 
is there any allegation that any relationship, including 
that of master-servant, existed between Knotts and 
appellant at the time of the trial. 
It is true that generally, the relation of 
master and servant or employer and employee between a 
party to an action and a prospective juror will serve as 
sufficient grounds for a challenge for cause. 47 Am.Jur.2d 
869, § 326. Cases have held, however, that where a juror 
was formerly employed by a party to an action, and such 
employment no longer exists, an objection to the juror's 
competency will not lie. Walter v. Louisville R. Co., 
150 Ky. 652, 150 S.W. 824 (1912). 
Appellant failed to establish the relationship of 
master-servant at the time of the trial, and therefore was 
not entitled to challenge the juror for implied bias under 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-19(2) (1953). 
POINT III 
FAILURE OF APPELLANT TO RAISE POSSIBLE VALID 
OBJECTION, WHEN HE DISCOVERED DURING TRIAL POSSIBLE GROUNDS 
FOR OBJECTION TO JUROR, CONSTITUTED A WAIVER OF ANY SUCH 
OBJECTION. 
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Appellant's affidavit (R.17) states that he 
did not recognize Lawrence Knotts until a recess in 
the trial when he was pointed out by appellant's 
mother, and that appellant never informed his attorney 
of this relationship to Lawrence Knotts until subsequent 
to the trial. 
The well recognized rule of law in most juris-
dictions holds that if knowledge of the disqualification 
of a juror is acquired after the jury is sworn, but 
before verdict, a failure to make objection at the time 
will amount to a waiver of the right to a new trial on 
that ground. Queenan v. Territory, 11 Okla. 261, 71 
P. 218, aff'd 190 U.S. 548, 47 L.Ed. 1175, 23 S.Ct. 762 
(1901); Kelly v. Gulf Oil Corporation, D.C. Pa., 28 F. 
Supp. 205, aff'd C.C.A., 105 F.2d 1018 (1939). 
This rule of law is followed in Utah. Browning 
v. Bank of Vernal, 60 Utah 197, 207 Pac. 462 (1922). In 
Browning, one of the jurors sustained the relationship 
of debtor to the Bank of Vernal (defendant-appellant). 
Upon voir dire examination, the juror failed to disclose 
this relationship. It appeared that the assistant 
-9-
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cashier of the bank had personal knowledge of the relation-
ship of the juror to the bank/ was present in court at the 
time of the examination of the jurors respecting their 
qualifications as jurors, and did not advise appellant's 
counsel of the fact of the relationship. The Court denied 
appellant's motion for a new trial and said: 
"The fact that a juror sustains 
the relationship of debtor or creditor 
to a party to an action does not dis-
qualify the juror to act, but it gives 
to the litigant the right to challenge 
for cause such juror. That is a right 
that can be waived." 
The Court further explained the law applicable to the case: 
"No matter how good one's cause 
of challenge may be, it is clearly 
waived where no objection is made when 
the jury is impaneled, especially when 
he knew the facts constituting the 
grounds of challenge. It must appear 
that neither the party nor his counsel 
had knowledge of the disqualification. 
. . . To permit appellant now to insist 
upon the disqualification of the juror 
as grounds for a new trial, when the 
fact of such disqualification was 
known to the officers of the appellant 
at the time of the trial, would be to 
permit litigants to trifle with the 
court." 
Other Utah cases upheld the trial court's over-
ruling a challenge to jurors for cause after completion of 
-10-
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the jury, holding that this right to challenge may be 
waived. State v. Lanos, 63 Utah 151, 223 Pac. 1065 
(1924); Johnson v. Allen, 108 Utah 148, 158 P.2d 134 
(1945). 
State v. Draper, 83 Utah 115, 27 P.2d 39 
(1933) , which appellant cites, denied a motion for a 
new trial. The motion was made on the grounds that, 
after the verdict, it was discovered by defendant and 
his counsel for the first time that a juror, prior to 
being called in the box, had found and expressed opinions 
contrary to his statements on voir dire. The Court said 
that the showing was insufficient to order a new trial, 
and that the allegation was insufficient to justify the 
conclusion that the juror had prejudiced the case. 
In the case at bar, appellant had knowledge 
during the trial, and before the verdict, of his former 
relationship to Lawrence Knotts. He did not bring this 
to the attention of his counsel until after the trial 
(T.17). The proper course of action, if any ground 
existed at all for discharge of the juror Knotts or 
for a new trial, would have been to inform his counsel, 
-11-
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and his counsel in turn informing the court. This was not 
done; therefore, any objection was waived by appellant. 
As set forth in Union Electric Light and Power 
Co. v. Snyder Estate Co., D.C. Mo., 15 F.Supp. 379 (1936)/ 
parties litigant to a trial cannot gamble and trifle v/ith 
the court: 
"If the objection now . . . has 
such merit as that because of it the 
verdict should be set aside, it would 
have supported a motion to discharge 
the jury before the verdict. A party 
cannot gamble with the possibility of 
a favorable verdict and then thereafter, 
when the verdict proves unfavorable, 
raise a question he might have raised 
before the verdict." 
Appellant had knowledge, but took no action, 
thereby waiving his objection to misconduct or disqualifi-
cation of the juror. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. 
Cushman, 22 Wash.2d 930, 158 P.2d 101 (1945); Nelson v. 
Hardesty, 205 Kan. 112, 468 P.2d 173 (1970). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not commit error in denying 
the appellant a new trial and the judgment should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
affnmpvQ fnr ResDondent 
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